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Summary
Change detection is a popular task to study visual short-term
memory (STM) in humans [1–4]. Much of this work suggests
that STM has a fixed capacity of 4 6 1 items [1–6]. Here we
report the first comparison of change-detection memory
between humans and a species closely related to humans,
the rhesus monkey. Monkeys and humans were tested in
nearly identical procedures with overlapping display sizes.
Although the monkeys’ STM was well fit by a one-item
fixed-capacity memory model, other monkey memory tests
with four-item lists have shown performance impossible to
obtain with a one-item capacity [7]. We suggest that this
contradiction can be resolved using a continuous-resource
approach more closely tied to the neural basis of memory
[8, 9]. In this view, items have a noisymemory representation
whose noise level depends on display size as a result of the
distributed allocation of a continuous resource. In accord
with this theory, we show that performance depends on
the perceptual distance between items before and after the
change, and d 0 depends on display size in an approximately
power-law fashion. Our results open the door to combining
the power of psychophysics, computation, and physiology
to better understand the neural basis of STM.Results and Discussion
Understanding memory is one of the great scientific chal-
lenges of the 21st century. An essential component of all
memory is the ability to store and process information in
short-term memory (STM). Human memory research has sug-
gested that STM may have a limited capacity of about 4 6 1
items (e.g., [5, 6]). Change detection has become one of the
most popular procedures to study STM. In one change-detec-
tion paradigm, several objects (e.g., colored squares) are pre-
sented as an array (sample display). Following a retention
delay, a test display is presented with one object changed.
Participants are required to identify the changed object.
Change detection is well suited to investigating short-term*Correspondence: lauren.c.elmore@uth.tmc.edu (L.C.E.), anthony.a.
wright@uth.tmc.edu (A.A.W.)memory because many memory objects can be presented
simultaneously within the time period of STM. Furthermore,
change detection has been shown to utilize visual memory,
independent of verbal rehearsal, making it a suitable task for
testing the STM of nonhuman animals with well-developed
visual systems [2, 4].
This report shows, for the first time, parallel results from
memory tests of humans and a nonhuman animal species
using the same basic change-detection task with overlapping
display sizes. Rhesus monkeys are an ideal species to
compare to humans because they perform well in other visual
memory tasks (e.g., list memory), and because they are the
standard medical model for humans. Much of what we learn
about STM in rhesus monkeys should be applicable to under-
standing human STM. A memory model with rhesus monkeys
can provide the foundation for memory studies that are
difficult to conduct with humans, such as lesions, electrophys-
iological recordings, pharmacological manipulations, and
gene-expression studies. Such studies can greatly advance
our understanding of memory and would provide a means to
evaluate treatments of memory failure when combined with
a monkey STM model as proposed later in this report.
Studies of visual memory in rhesusmonkeys performing list-
memory tasks have found striking qualitative similarities
between human and monkey memory [7]. Namely, serial posi-
tion effects occur in both species, and primacy and recency
effects depend on the delay interval. Given the similarities
demonstrated in the list-memory tasks, we hypothesized
that qualitative similarities between humans and monkeys
might be apparent in change-detection tasks as well. To this
end, we tested two rhesus monkeys and six human subjects
in nearly identical change-detection procedures. The basic
task design is illustrated in Figure 1A. Two important parame-
ters were manipulated in order to investigate the functional
relationships of STM: display size and object type. Display
size refers to the number of items presented in the sample
display. Monkeys were tested with display sizes of 2, 4, and
6, and humans were tested with display sizes of 2, 4, 6, 8,
and 10. Both species were tested with two types of objects:
colors and clip art figures (for details, see Supplemental Infor-
mation available online).
Figure 1B shows that both monkey and human performance
were accurate but decreased as display size increased.
Separate repeated-measures analyses of variance (ANOVAs)
of display size 3 object type revealed a significant effect of
display size for both monkeys [M1: F(2,6) = 12.469, p = 0.007;
M2: F(2,6) = 20.258, p = 0.002] and humans [F(4,20) = 24.047,
p < 0.001]. At the overlapping display sizes of two, four, and
six items, humans outperformed monkeys by an average of
16.5% on clip art trials and by 22.0% on color trials. A
repeated-measures ANOVA of display size 3 object type 3
species revealed a significant effect of display size [F(2,24) =
39.045, p < 0.001], a significant effect of species [F(1,12) =
60.159, p = 0.001], and a significant interaction of object type
and species [F(1,12) = 6.679, p = 0.024].
Capacity estimates were obtained for each individual
subject using a method described previously [3]. Mean
capacity estimates by species, object type, and display size
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Figure 1. Change Detection: Task and Percent Correct
(A) Schematic of a change-detection task showing two clip-art trials (figure not drawn to scale). Rhesusmonkeys viewed sample displays for 5 s, followed by
50ms delays. Monkeyswere reinforcedwith either cherry Kool-Aid or a 300mg banana pellet (pseudorandomly) following correct responses (touches to the
changed item in the test display). Trials were separated by 15 s (intertrial interval) accompanied by a dim green light through a slit between the monitor and
chamber. Green-light offset cued the start of the next trial. Humans viewed sample displays for 1 s, followed by 900 ms (colors) or 1000 ms (clip art) delays,
with 2 s intertrial intervals. They were instructed to touch the changed item in the test display, and dim room illumination red (incorrect) and green (correct)
lights behind humans provided feedback; light offset cued the start of the next trial. (See Supplemental Information for more details and rationale.)
(B) Change-detection percent-correct performance by monkeys and humans. Error bars represent standard error of the mean.
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of 2.46 6 0.35 for colors and 2.78 6 0.39 for clip art. Although
the mean capacity estimate was somewhat lower than typi-
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Figure 2. Fixed-Capacity Model
Capacity estimates were calculated for each subject at each display size and e
[(N 2 C)/N]2 3 50% + {1 2 [(N 2 C)/N]2} 3 100%, where N is the display siz
(A) Mean capacity estimates for monkeys and humans. Mean capacity values
(excluding size 2 for humans as is customary for sizes less than capacity). Err
(B) Individual monkey capacity estimates for clip art.
(C) Individual monkey capacity estimates for colors.
(D) Individual human capacity estimates for clip art.
(E) Individual human capacity estimates for colors.procedures (two-item test displays with one item changed)
showed virtually identical capacities (2.4–2.5) for colors [3,
Experiment 1A]. Somewhat different change-detection proce-







































ach object type according to the formula used by Eng et al. [3]: Accuracy =
e and C is the capacity estimate.
are shown in the legend for species and object type across display sizes
or bars represent standard error of the mean.
M 1
Dim ension 1






























Figure 3. Multidimensional Scaling of the Monkey Change Detection for Sample Colors Changing to Test Colors
Asymmetric, metric multidimensional scaling was performed on the percent-correct data from 10 sessions with a two-item display size and all the possible
combinations of changed objects (e.g., red in the sample display changes to blue in the test display). Percent-correct accuracy maps onto distance in the
multidimensional space so that greater distance reflects greater accuracy. These data were collected prior to tests with two-, four-, and six-item displays
(see Supplemental Information for details). M1: r2 = 0.61; stress = 0.303. M2: r2 = 0.56; stress = 0.332.
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the claimed 4 6 1 human capacity limit [5, 6]. Having all
(unchanged) sample items presented during the test may
provide additional context cues leading to enhanced STM. If
so, monkeys too should show enhanced STM with such
a procedure. However, a recent article (published during
processing of the current article) using this procedure did
not find better rhesusmonkey performance, although capacity
estimates or human comparisons were not made [10].
According to a fixed-capacity model of STM, capacity
estimates at display sizes that exceed capacity should be
constant for individual participants. But there is a large
amount of within- and between-subject variability (Figures
2D and 2E); for instance, in the clip-art condition, S6’s
capacity estimates range from 1.65 (four-item display) to
5.29 (ten-item display). Such discrepancies in capacity within
individual subjects are not consistent with a fixed capacity.
Even more surprising are the strikingly low values (%1) ob-
tained for rhesus monkey STM capacity. Monkey capacity
for clip art was found to be 1.026 0.19, and capacity for colors
was found to be 0.716 0.24. Although it may not be surprising
to discover that STM capacity in monkeys is less than human
capacity, a limit of a single object is unusually low. Tests of list
memory show that rhesus monkeys can remember at least
four visual or auditory stimuli [7]. Comparisons of visual list
memory to change-detection memory are somewhat indirect
because list-memory performance changes for the four
serial positions as retention delays increase from 0 to 30 s
or more. Nevertheless, if visual STM were fixed at one item,
then good memory for the first list items would not develop
after long delays (e.g., 10 to 30 s), and near-ceiling perfor-
mance for the last list items would not occur at short delays
(e.g., 0 to 2 s).
A second issue with a fixed-capacity model is shown by
a multidimensional scaling analysis of the monkey color data
in Figure 3. Monkeys frequently made mistakes when colors
were similar; for instance, M1 was at chance when magenta
changed to purple (52% correct), whereas M2’s performance
was near chance when purple changed to blue (57% correct).By contrast, M1 performed perfectly (100% correct) when red
changed to green, and M2 was perfectly accurate when green
changed to orange. Indeed, substantial variance is accounted
for by color-memory confusability; r 2 values were 0.61 for
M1 and 0.56 for M2. The finding of color confusability is
not consistent with a high-resolution fixed-capacity store,
because fixed-capacity models claim that an item is either
perfectly stored (and not confusable) or not stored at all.
A third issue of a fixed-capacity account is that human
performance should have been perfect for display size 2.
Intriguingly, two subjects made mistakes in the two-item
display condition. S3 was only 93.3% accurate (capacity of
1.27) with colors, and S4 was only 96% accurate (capacity of
1.43) with clip art. Indeed, perfect performance for display
sizes less than capacity is a hallmark of fixed-capacity
accounts. Occasionally, adjustments have been made for
less-than-perfect performance by adding a factor for inatten-
tion [11]. But representing attention as either perfect attention
or complete inattention is conceptually implausible.
A detection theory account of STM, known as the contin-
uous-resource model (Figure 4A), provides an alternative
framework with which to interpret our results from humans
and monkeys [8, 9]. This model proposes that STM does not
have a fixed, discrete capacity but rather consists of a contin-
uous resource distributed among many stimuli. Working
memory limitations arise from noise in the internal representa-
tion of each item. As display size increases, an itemwill receive
less resource on average and consequently has a noisier
internal representation [10, 11]. Determining which object
has changed in a change-detection task becomes more diffi-
cult as display size increases, not because the capacity has
been exceeded but rather because it becomes a problem of
extracting a signal (memory for the object) from a noisy repre-
sentation. Differences between humans and monkeys can be
explained by differences in the level of overall attention to
the task, because attention has the effect of increasing the
signal-to-noise ratio. In the continuous-resourcemodel, atten-
tion varying over a wide range is accounted for, unlike the
fixed-capacity model.
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Figure 4. Continuous-Resource Model of Change Detection
(A) Each item is represented in a noisy manner, giving rise to perceived changes of the two test-display objects. Decisions are made by comparing the
difference between those perceived changes to zero. Shown are the probability distributions of this difference when the change occurred in item one
(yellow) or item two (green). The distance between the means is the magnitude of the signal; it is affected by the perceptual distance between the items
across the change. The model asserts that the signal-to-noise ratio decreases in power-law fashion with display size.
(B) Power-law fits of mean d0 values of monkeys and humans with colors and clip art. Error bars represent standard error of the mean. d0 values were
calculated using a method described by Macmillan and Creelman for two-alternative forced-choice experiments [13]. Trials were divided into hits (H),
misses, false alarms (F), and correct rejections based on object position. d0 was then calculated using the following formula: d0 = 1/O2 [z(H)2 z(F)]; d0 values
were calculated for individual subjects and then averaged for display in this figure. Power-law fits were made to the d0 results of individual subjects, and the
means of those four functions are displayed on the graph.
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utilizes d0 values [12, 13]. The model predicts that d0 will
decrease as display size increases according to a power-law
function [8, 9]. Figure 4B shows the d0 values for the results
shown in Figure 1B. As with capacity estimates, d0 was found
to be higher for human subjects than for monkeys. Monkey
d0 values were well fit by power-law functions: r 2 was 0.98
for colors and 0.99 for clip art. Human d0 values from both
the color and clip art conditions were also well fit by power-
law functions: r 2 was 0.75 for colors and 0.70 for clip art (see
Supplemental Information for details). Across conditions, the
average estimated value of the power in the human power
law was 0.79 6 0.07, close to the one that was reported
recently, 0.74 6 0.06 [9].
Further support for a continuous-resource model account
comes from the previously mentioned multidimensional
scaling of monkey color results (Figure 3) showing that some
colors are more confusable than others. In the continuous-
resource model, the ability to detect a change is determined
by the ratio of the perceptual distance between items to the
noise. Confusion between the stimuli as a result of noise,
which is the core of the continuous-resource model, cannot
be reinterpreted within the framework of the fixed-capacity
model.
The continuous-resource account of monkey and human
STMmemory fits into 50 years of development of signal-detec-
tion theory. Signal-detection theory is the dominant framework
to account for how humans and animals perceive stimuli in
noise [12, 13]. Functional relationships showing how perfor-
mance (d0) changes with memory load (sample display size)
according to the continuous-resource model go beyond
functional relationships of percent correct changes with
sample display size (e.g., Figure 1B). The latter is a descriptive
account without accounting for how memory varies with
display size or how the brain might produce these memoryresults. The continuous-resource account postulates that
d0 changes inversely as a power of the display size. This rela-
tionship is shown to be a good fit for the data in Figure 4B.
The fixed-capacity model, on the other hand, predicts that
capacity will be the same at all display sizes, except for display
sizes less than the capacity limit where performance should be
perfect (100% correct). Performance is not always perfect at
display sizes less than capacity and is seldom found to remain
invariant at display sizes greater than capacity [3, 4]. Indeed,
neither of those requirements was met by humans or monkeys
in this study. Furthermore, capacity estimates of one item
obtained in this study are inconsistent with earlier reports
demonstrating near-ceiling performance in visual list memory
by rhesus monkeys at short delays [7]. A potential explanation
for the performance differences between list-memory and
change-detection tasks by rhesus monkeys relates to noise
at the time of encoding. In list-memory tasks, stimuli are pre-
sented sequentially, one at a time, in one location. However,
in change detection, all stimuli are presented simultaneously,
in unique locations. Simultaneous presentation requires the
monkey to efficiently divide his attention across space, among
all objects in the sample display. This could result in noisier
representations in STM, thereby explaining the lower perfor-
mance found in change detection tasks relative to list-memory
tasks. This explanation fits within the framework of the contin-
uous-resource model given its prediction that increases in
noise lead to decreases in performance.
Perhaps most discriminating for these STM models is how
memory might operate at the neural level. The fixed-capacity
model says that each item is stored and remembered
perfectly—or not at all. When all the memory slots are filled,
then nothing is remembered about any additional item for
that STM bout. This is problematic from a neurobiological
point of view. The storage, maintenance, and retrieval of
information (i.e., memory) are likely probabilistic, similar to
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signaling probability (i.e., confidence) of correctly detecting
an object change [14] or neurons in the monkey superior
colliculus signaling probability (i.e., confidence) of an object
selection [15]. In a broader context, the nervous system is
noisy [16], and its computations are probabilistic [9, 17–19].
The continuous-resource model captures the noisy nature of
the nervous system—and hence provides a plausible account
of how the STM system might work, in general.
We have shown for the first time that a nonhuman animal, the
rhesus monkey, can perform a change-detection task with the
same items, same procedures, and the same display sizes as
humans. We show that the functional relationships for
monkeys and humans are qualitatively similar. We also show
that there are quantitative differences between monkeys and
humans. These quantitative differences may be related to
better-developed human brain areas, such as the prefrontal
cortex, that are known to be instrumental in controlling
memory processing and attention [20]. Anatomical species
differences and similarities should help discriminate functional
brain areas from those that are not instrumental in mediating
a particular type of memory. A memory model with rhesus
monkeys can provide the foundation for biological studies of
memory that are difficult to conduct with humans. Such
studies, in conjunction with a plausible model framework like
the continuous-resource model, offer potential for rapidly
advancing our understanding of memory and evaluating treat-
ments of memory problems.Supplemental Information
Supplemental Information includes Supplemental Experimental Procedures
and Supplemental Data Analysis and can be found with this article online at
doi:10.1016/j.cub.2011.04.031.
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